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Abstract
A fi nancial crisis appears to occur in a certain patt ern; it usually starts with 
a rally of bank credits against a backdrop of easier monetary policy, ample 
liquidity, and more relaxed banking regulations. Such fi nancial environment 
stimulates excess leverage to fund assets in real estates and housing in which 
consumers take advantage of cheap money and borrow heavily, while bankers 
zealously lend out in order to achieve high loan growth targets. As with 
all levered instruments, this practice generates great profi ts when the asset 
value rises. In contrast, it produces great losses when the assets fall in value, 
forcing lenders to ration credits and to compete aggressively for funds to 
cover the resultant losses. Retrospectively, the Global Financial Crisis 
exhibits far reaching implications from the excessive leverage,  deregulation 
and from the spiral eff ects of globalisation, fi nancial speculation, product 
innovation, moral hazards, and incentives problems. This paper refl ects how 
similar or diff erent the Global Financial Crisis is from the past crises in terms 
of its causes and manifestations, how Malaysia was impacted, and what key 
lessons could be learned from it.
Keywords: Financial crisis; risk taking and banking.
Introduction
A fi nancial crisis is a regular incidence in the world. The term 
fi nancial crisis is often associated with situations in which banks or 
fi nancial institutions experience signifi cant fall in their asset value, 
to such an extent that they face the probability of huge income losses 
or in worse cases, insolvency. Banking assets such as loans, stocks 
and shares, securities, and money market instruments are subject 
to price risk, causing their market values and income to fl uctuate in 
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not generate interest income to the lending banks if there are large 
loan defaults by their borrowers. The inability to service loans occurs 
when borrowers take large amounts of debts, in excess of their equity 
or their means to pay. This is made worse when there are sharp 
increases in cost of funds as bankers increased their lending rates 
during credit rationing and compete aggressively for funds to cover 
losses (Benn, 2009). Conversely, in situations where there is ample 
or excess liquidity in the fi nancial system, credits are readily and 
easily available for investments in stock and shares, real estates or 
housing, or other fi nancial instruments. It is also during easy money 
periods that regulators relax the regulations to ensure funds are 
transmitt ed into the economy and fully mobilised so that infl ation is 
within control. Driven by economic buoyancy in such situation and 
prospects of higher profi ts as asset prices increase, people tend to 
indulge in excessive leverage and speculative activities. As with all 
levered (debt-based) instruments, this practice generates high profi ts 
when the asset value rises. However, it produces great losses when the 
assets fall in value during market crash or fi nancial crisis (Benn, 2009). 
In most fi nancial crises, excessive leverage and speculative elements 
are among the roots of fi nancial losses leading to contractions in 
economic activities.               
Table 1 shows the list of major fi nancial crises in the world. Many of 
these crises were connected with stock market crash and bank lending 
defaults.  Figure 1 provides an illustration of the fi nancial crises and 
some of the contributory factors to the crises. 
Table 1
List of Financial Crisis (1930–2009)
Year Crisis Description
1930s The Great 
Depression
The largest economic depression in the 20th 
century. Triggered by stock market crash on 
29 Oct 1929. Spread to almost all countries in 
the world. 
1973 1973 Oil Crisis Oil prices soared, causing the 1973–74 stock 
market crash
1980 Latin American 
Debt Crisis 
Large debts borrowed by Latin countries. 
Large defaults and liquidity crunch when 
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Year Crisis Description
1987 Black Monday The largest one-day percentage decline in 
the stock market history. Stock market crash 
began in Japan, spread to Europe, USA and 
other countries.
1989–1990 USA Loan 
crisis
United States Saving and Loan Industry 
Crisis resulting in USD153 billion losses from 
mismanagement in asset-liability interest rate 
structures.
1990 Japan Banking 
Crisis of 1990s
Japanese asset price bubble due to heavy 
speculative activities, deregulations leading 
to the banking crisis
1992–1993 Black 
Wednesday
Speculative att ack on currencies in the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism
1994–1995 Economic 
Crisis in Mexico
Speculative att ack and defaults on Mexico 
debts
1997–1998 Asian Financial 
Crisis




Started by large loan defaults in subprime 
housing mortgages and falling securities 
prices that are tied to the housing price 
bubbles in the USA; causing severe business 
and bank failures globally.
Source. Wikipedia  encyclopedia- fi nancial crisis.
Global Financial Crisis: Diff erences and Similarities  
The Global Financial Crisis (herein referred as the “Crisis”) is claimed 
as the most severe crisis in the extent and severity of its global 
impact since World War II (Truman, 2009) or the Great Depression 
in 1930s (Deepak, 2009). The Crisis surfaced in the US subprime 
mortgage sector in August 2007 and transformed into a global crisis 
in September 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. What is 
perplexing about the Global Financial Crisis is that it started in the 
United States of America, the most advanced economy in the world. 
According to Truman (2009), it was the US that led the way into 
the crisis when the US economic and fi nancial system experienced 
deteriorating negative growth.  Although the Great Depressions in 
the 1930s had the global eff ects, the baffl  ing point was the speed the 
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economies. This somewhat unearthed the powerful domino eff ects of 
globalisation and the dark side of fi nancial capitalism not experienced 
in the previous fi nancial crises.   
The extent of the impact in terms of fi nancial loss could be gauged 
from the sharp upward revisions of the write downs by banks from 
about US$ 500 billion in March 2008 to about US$ 3.5 trillion in 
October 2009. On the global side, the world GDP is estimated by IMF 
to have shrunk by 0.8% and the world trade volume to decline by 12% 
(BIS, 2010). 
With such magnitude eff ects, regulators, economists, and scholars 
continue to identify the fundamental causes of the Crisis, although the 
immediate factor that triggered the Crisis was the subprime mortgage 
crisis. Although several writers cite bursting of the US housing bubble 
as the start of the Crisis, the genesis of the crisis went beyond that 
to several macroeconomic and microeconomic factors and to human 
psychology. Some of these factors are subsequently discussed. 
Source. Citigroup Inc September 2008 – Credit Crisis: What, How, Why and 
When; (Lum   et. al, 2008).
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Liquidity and easy credits
One of the key macroeconomic factors  was a very high liquidity and 
cheap money period in the US economy. In the years leading to the 
Crisis, USA was the recipient of a signifi cant infl ow of funds from fast-
growing economies in Asia and oil producing countries. This fl ow 
of funds allowed the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates, which 
contributed to easy availability of bank credits. There was also high 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves from developing countries 
in the US and also in Japan (Truman, 2009). Monetary policies were 
easy then and interest rates were revised lower several times (due 
to greater liquidity when US borrowed money abroad to cover its 
widening trade defi cits). Current account defi cit increased from 1% 
to 5.8% of GDP. This uphill fl ow of funds cited by the US Bernanke as 
“saving glut”, the abundant foreign exchange reserves, which fl ushed 
the US economy with ample liquidity and easy monetary policies, 
were quoted as early factors germinating the Crisis.  
Excessive leverage and off -balance sheets activities
The early impact of easy money was initially felt at the micro level. 
Spurred by more relaxed borrowing terms and procedures, and 
generous tax incentives, new and existing borrowers took more loans 
to own properties instead of renting them as in the past, thereby 
increasing their leverage and excessive use of credits. The leverage 
level (computed on USA household debt as a percentage of annual 
disposable income) increased almost 2x (2:1) to 127% at the end of 
1997 from 77% in 1990.  By 2009, the leverage ratio was 30:1, that is, 
total liabilities is 30x more than the equity value, a far too dangerous 
leverage level (Benn, 2009). This situation bears similarity with several 
episodes of the past crises in terms of excessive use of credits, heavy 
reliance on leverage, and relaxation of credit standards (Reinhart & 
Rogoff , 2009). The global dimension of the Crisis is neither new nor 
unique in this aspect, both on the demand and the supply sides. As the 
borrowers (representing the demand side) incurred very high gearing 
with those large loans, the lending fi nancial institutions (which 
represent the supplier side), simultaneously had high debts in their 
books as more borrowers faced diffi  culties to meet their obligations. 
The accumulation of non-repayments had caused the formation of 
high credit risk and instantaneously, market risk, as housing and 
property prices plummeted down on depressed economic conditions. 
For many US banks, the resulted high credit risk and market risk 
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means that they had to strengthen their capital base in order to 
maintain a minimum 8% capital to risky assets ratio as per Basel 
requirement. However, the innovative way the banks did to 
circumvent the requirement, at the same time controlling the risks, 
was to take the debts off  from the banks’ Balance sheets. This was 
achieved by securitising the loans or mortgages into new securities, 
assigned new risk rating based on the issuer’s (the relevant bank’s) 
credit standing and sold them to new investors (RER, 2008). These 
products such as the mortgage-backed securities, collaterised debt 
obligations and credit default swaps and other off -balance sheet 
fi nancing were pertinent to the Crisis, and their presence set it 
diff erent from the past crises. In terms of risk management, fi nancial 
innovation creates a new untested territory until the Crisis. Since not 
many were technically knowledgeable and competent to deal with the 
new, more complicated risks arising from the innovative products, 
there were inadequate risk mitigation techniques to deal with them 
in  a timely manner.             
                                        
           “Shadow banking system”
The US fi nancial system saw active participation of non-banking 
institutions in the credit markets parallel to the banking system. 
Unlike banks which are heavily regulated, these fi nancial institutions 
such as mutual funds, hedge funds, private equity fi rms, pension 
funds, insurance companies are not subjected to strict regulations. 
They represent the “shadow banking system”.  
Shadow banking  institutions operate on high leverage as they borrow 
on short-term basis to fi nance long-term, illiquid assets.  Since they 
are not under the control of a formal banking system, their risk taking 
activities escaped the scrutiny of the regulators. These institutions 
participated actively in securitised assets at that time prior to the 
meltdown of the US economy (Farhi, Marcos & Cintra, 2009).  Hence, 
liquidity risk, market, and credit risk (arising from the mismatch in 
maturities of assets and liabilities) were not able to be detected until 
they escalated alarmingly; by then they would contagiously aff ect 
other globally linked institutions and companies. 
How Malaysia was Impacted
Malaysia was not spared from the Crisis.  Similar to other emerging 
market economies, the Crisis spread from three channels; confi dence, 
fi nance, and trade (Deepak, 2009). Lower investors’ confi dence was 
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from the third quarter 2008 until the second quarter of 2009. The 
reduction in FDI primarily from  North, Central, and South America, 
and Northeast Asia. FDI from the US fell from RM1,100 million in the 
fi rst quarter 2008 to RM 445million in the fi rst quarter of 2009.  On the 
other hand, outward FDI from Malaysia had risen faster than  inward 
FDI (BNM Report, 2009; UNDP Report, 2009). As of second quarter 
2009, investment outfl ow was RM95,000 million, whilst investment 
infl ow was RM6,899 million. Overall, the situation resulted in negative 
net FDI infl ow for Malaysia and without any additional measures, 
this was expected to continue until 2010. Among the 10 member Asian 
countries, Malaysia is currently the only country to suff er negative 
fl ows (Thew, 2008). In this respect, several strategies are already in 
place to step up FDI from other countries such as Middle East and 
Brazil.
The Malaysian equity market saw the impact of the Crisis in 
terms of a downward trend of FBMKLCI, which declined to 1000 
psychological level from the month of October 2008 (1,100 points) to 
April 2009 (990.74 points). However, sound regulations and the lack 
of major players in the local bourse prevented a major market crash 
and managed to sustain the stock market buoyancy. On renewed and 
stronger market sentiment, FBMKLCI increased to 1,175 points in 
July 2009 from 990 level in April 2009 (Mahani and  Rajah). 
The Malaysian banking sector however did not experience adverse 
performance. The banks did not invest in toxic assets nor in the 
subprime mortgage stocks. Thus, with regulations in place and bett er 
quality assets (non-performing loan ratio reduced to 2.2%), domestic 
fi nancial institutions remained sound. But the worst aff ected were 
export-related sectors, especially the manufacturing sector.  As a result 
of a collapse in demand in developed markets, manufactured exports 
dropped by –11.7% in the fourth quarter of 2008, –19%,  and –14.5% 
in the fi rst and second quarter of 2009, respectively. Electronic exports 
declined signifi cantly by  –44% and –34.6% during the corresponding 
periods. These contractions took a toll on the Malaysian economy 
where GDP growth rate declined from 0.1% in the last quarter of 2008 
to –6.2% in fi rst quarter of 2009, and a further drop by –3.9% in the 
second quarter 2009. The grimness of the impact of the Crisis was 
refl ected in the downslide of the Malaysian economy into recession 
in 2009. 
As one of the strategies to revive the economy, the Malaysian 
government allocated RM7 billion as the fi rst economic stimulus 
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package. The RM67 billion package, which accounted for 7% of 2009 
GDP was aimed to stimulate private sector demand and private 
consumption. To stimulate further liquidity in the fi nancial system, 
the government has lowered overnight policy rate (OPR) by 25 
basis points to 3.25% in November 2008, a further reduction of 75 
basis points and 50 basis points in January and February 2009 to 
2%. Statutory Reserve Requirement was lowered by 50 basis points 
from 4% to 3.5%.  The stimulus package and expansionary monetary 
policy helped to strengthen domestic and external demand and the 
Malaysian economy registered a positive growth of 4.5% for the 
fourth quarter of 2009 and 10.1% in the fi rst quarter of 2010. (BNM, 
2010). However, as a result of the RM67 billion stimulus package 
and the severe shortfall in inward FDI as well as the decrease in its 
exports, Malaysia is facing the biggest fi scal defi cit after 22 years. This 
is an indirect but signifi cant impact of the Crisis on the Malaysian 
economy.
Lessons Learned
The Global Financial Crisis exhibits several lessons about the 
enormous risks originating not only from excessive leverage and 
deregulation, but also from the spiral eff ects of globalisation, fi nancial 
speculation, product innovation, moral hazards, and incentive 
problems.  
More watchful eyes should be in place to monitor and control 
excessive risk-taking from over leveraging during good times of 
deregulation and relaxed monetary policies. Excessive debts and 
over leveraging should not be encouraged by so many “sweeteners” 
created by product innovations. The public should be aware that “too 
good to be true is probably false” (Truman, 2009).
The past crises and the Global Financial Crisis also showed that 
the seeds of fi nancial risks are actually sown during easy economic 
conditions, only waiting to lurk during bad times. Hence, it is not 
only during the bad times but equally important during good times 
that fi nancial sector supervision and regulation should be strictly 
kept prudent.  If the governance is strictly adhered to, the economy 
and the public might be less impacted by excessive risk-taking and 
speculative activities. The alert sign is the asset prices. Rapid upward 
movements in asset prices would result in infl ation in asset prices, 
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stability could be jeopardised if there is infl ationary pressure in asset 
prices, causing the price bubbles to burst (Deepak, 2009). 
Another lesson is the spiral eff ects of globalisation. Although spared 
from the credit risk and systemic market risks on the banking assets, 
several countries experienced adverse eff ects on exports due to lower 
global demand from the aff ected economies (mainly the US and 
Europe),  labour  mobility, global wage competition (as the free fl ow 
of knowledge allows manufacturing activities to be easily re-located 
anywhere), price competitiveness, and cross-border contagion eff ects 
(Kawai, 2009).   
Many researchers, policy makers, and regulators would have 
summed up the causes of the economic and global fi nancial crisis 
as the interactive and combined eff ects of  the economic, fi nancial, 
regulatory, and supervisory policies of the US and other industrial 
economies.  
However, the Crisis highlighted incentive problems and human 
greed.  Most of the large companies that failed in the Global Financial 
Crisis such as  Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sacs, and Citigroup Inc. 
had very att ractive performance-based executive compensation 
or incentive packages for their top management. They are payable 
both in the form of cash and equity or stock options. With stock 
options, the executives tend to gain substantially if they sell their 
equity when stock price goes up. On the other hand, they would not 
experience any actual loss if the price falls (unless they exercise the 
options). In such situations, these executives have greater incentives 
to indulge in excessive risk-taking activities since they would not 
incur any material losses if the stock price drops (Berrone, 2008). 
The corporations did not only experience losses due to moral hazard 
activities by their executives but also became almost insolvent due to 
hefty sums paid to these executives, in terms of compensations. As a 
lesson, the Crisis illustrates that long-established institutions could 
collapse due to moral hazard activities, including outrageously high 
incentives designed for self-interests of certain executives. 
In a nutshell, how developed a fi nancial market is, how well-
structured fi nancial products are, or how early the warning signals 
are, there is nothing that could guarantee against the foibles of human 
nature (Reinhart & Rogoff , 2008). As past studies have shown that 
human greed is the nub of all the fi nancial crises (Gahbraith, 1993), it 
is about time that behind all the sophistications of today’s world, we 












60    IJMS 17 (Special Issue), 51–61 (2010)       
References
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). (2009).  BNM Report 2009. Retrived 
from htt p://www.bnm.gov.my
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) (2010).  Quarterly Bulletin - First 
Quarter 2010. Calendar of Events Jan–March 2010. Retrieved from 
htt p://bnm.gov.my
Benn, S.  (2009). Lessons of the fi nancial  crisis. Council Special Report 
No.45 (March, 2009). Council on Foreign Relations, Center for 
Geoeconomics Studies,  New York, USA.
Berrone, P. (2008). Current global fi nancial crisis: An incentive 
problem. Occasional Paper OP-158, October 2008; ISSE Business 
School- University of Navarra, Barcelona, Spain.
Bank International Sett lement (BIS). (2009). The global fi nancial crisis – 
genesis, impact and lessons. Retrieved from htt p://www.bis.org
Deepak, M. (2009). The global fi nancial crisis-genesis, impact 
and lessons. International Conference on Frontiers of Interface 
between statistics and science, organised by Advanced Institute 
of Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science and the 
University of Hyderabad, India.
Galbraith, J. K. (1993). A short history of fi nancial Euphoria. New York, 
USA: Penguin.
Farhi, M., Marcos., A., & Cintra, A. (2009). The fi nancial crisis and 
the global shadow banking system’  No 5. Crise du capitalisme 
fi nancier, Maison des Sciences de l’ Homme, Paris Nord, France. 
Retrieved from htt p://www.regulation.revus.org
Kawai, Masahiro. (2009). The impact of the global fi nancial crisis 
on Asia and Asia’s responses crisis developments and long-
term global responses: Insights from Asia and Europe, AEEF 
Conference, Kiel, Asian Development Bank Institute.
Lum, C. A., Ramalingam, Tan, L. H., &  Sama, K. V. J. M (2008). Global 
fi nancial crisis, causes and eff ects. (Unpublished master’s thesis).
Abidin, M. Z., & Rasiah, R. (2009). Global fi nancial crisis and the  impact 
on Malaysia. UNDP Report 2009, United Nations Development 
Programme, Damansara Heights, Kuala Lumpur. Retrieved 
from htt p://www.undp.org.my
Reinhart, C., & Rogoff , K. S. (2009). This time is diff erent: 8 centuries of 
fi nancial folly. Princeton University Press. 
Rogue Economist (RER). (2008). Speculation on bank strategy: 
Capital adequacy perspective. Retrieved from htt p://www.
rogueeconomistrants.blog spots.com













IJMS 17 (Special Issue), 51–61 (2010)    61 
Truman, E.M. (2009). The global fi nancial crisis: Lessons learned 
and challenges for developing countries.  Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, Remarks at the Eighteenth Cycle of 
Economics, Banco de Guatemala, June 16, 2009.
ht
tp
://
ijm
s.
uu
m
.e
du
.m
y
